The Role of the State in Development Politics
Last
week we looked at the interplay between the two key concepts of Democracy and Development, this week the topic is
specifically the role of the state itself in development, regardless of the
form of government.
States as viewed by history
Through
the course so far we have examined the various theories of development and how
they have changed over time. What that has shown is how the focus of the
development community on the State has changed with time, with the emphasis
placed on its importance ebbing and flowing.
Going back to Modernisation Theory in
the 50's and 60's and the State was the all-important factor that drove
development. However, as neo-liberal theories became the favourites of the
development crowd, the State took a backseat, with economics pushed to the fore.
However, it is obviously impossible to remove the state from the equation
completely, which leads to the question, asked by Maureen Mackintosh -
"What is wrong with the state?"
Mackintosh
brings a number of definitions into the argument, including the definitions of
private interest vs. public interest states. Private interest states are those
that follow the neo-liberal, market-based approach to government. Public
interest states believe that they can assess the needs of their citizens and
implement institutions to fulfil those needs. Both approaches bring different
problems and different perceived advantages.
What
Mackintosh also does is show how the State apparatus itself can cause problems,
specifically in that the State, inevitably, is made up of people and that
people are infallible. This leads to problems with corruption, rent-seeking and
bureaucracy and other inefficiencies or issues.
In
bringing these ideas into focus, Mackintosh introduces us to one of the current
trends in development - the need to cut the bloat of the state. Excess
bureaucracy is seen as a way of hiding corruption and inefficiencies - so
developing countries are being pushed to cut the size of the State in various
ways.
Getting to the source of the problem
One
of the readings I really enjoyed in this module was the one by Mick Moore -
"Political Underdevelopment: What causes 'Bad Governance'". Moore
takes the position that a lot of the issues for state's comes from the source
of their income - whether it is "earned" (i.e. tax revenue) or
"unearned" (i.e. from foreign direct investment or aid).
I
found this a fascinating article, not least because the theory seems to make a
lot of sense to me. Moore draws direct consequences from the fact that
governments are not beholden to the electorate, giving them the ability to
ignore citizens demands, or pay them off with a small percentage of their
unearned funds.
There
were a number of points that really hit home for me in this article and I've
tried to summarise them below:
- An effective system not only allows for
revenue collection, but also provides a great deal of information about a
state's citizens - if we make the assumption that in order to have an
effective democracy you need to be able to collect revenue, which is
Moore's theory here, does that mean that in order to have democracy we
have to trade some of our freedoms in terms of the State's knowledge of
us?
- Coups are less likely in a State financed by
taxes -
Moore's theory is that this is because it is a harder source of income to
take over, i.e. that proceeds from an oil field or diamond mine can be
easily subsumed by an armed force. I remember a fact from an earlier
module that there has never been a civil war in a full democracy, I wonder
if that is the case also for a regime that collects more than a certain
percentage of revenue from "earned" sources?
- Aid agencies can be destructive in this
environment - Moore claims that due to the fact that donor agencies are
individualistic, that States have multiple masters, each with different
aims and different targets, which will sometimes compete. This allows the
governments to always claim they are working towards their targets and
potentially always have an excuse for not hitting them.....while still
getting funding!
This
way of thinking obviously emphasises the differences between States that have a
bounty of natural resources vs. those that don't, as this is the most common
form of unearned income.
What makes a state "developmental"?
The
"developmental state" is an interesting concept. Effectively defined
by having a government that is trying to accelerate development either by
explicitly or implicitly encouraging development. The reading by Lockwood in
particular looks at a number of developing states in Africa (Botswana, Ghana,
Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique) and why they are classed as ahead of their
peers on the continent - as well as examining whether the picture in these
states is really as positive as some would have us believe.
African
nations seem to be particularly prone to clientelism - the practice of
delegating power to actors in reward for their loyalty and service. Lockwood
paints a picture of states bogged down in these practices and of supposedly
developmental states eventually succumbing to the same bad habits of their
neighbours.
In
each country he examines, the power of the individual ruler seems to have been
a driving force behind the development drive. In addition, the actual amount of
development seems to be unfortunately quite low, with real gains being
experienced by the privileged few, who are lifting the national average without
really raising the bottom rung.
This
section was actually quite depressing for me. I wondered if Lockwood's was an
isolated point of view, but then found similar recent pieces on Burundi, Venezuela and Rwanda. It seems that even in States where there
is a strong leader, committed to change, with a democratic basis of government,
an improving economy and strong civil society, that the same problems keep
re-surfacing. I guess if there's one small thing to be thankful (?) for it's
that this is not just a problem for developing countries.
Leftwich and the primacy of politics
I
found Adrian Leftwich's article on the primacy of politics a stimulating read.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Leftwich himself acknowledges that his is an unusual
position, I was hesitant at the start about the theory - in the modern day we
tend to think of politics=politicians=untrustworthy. So, I couldn't see how
definitive actions could be put in place to create a developmental state via
politics.
Leftwich's
overall claim is that donors should be putting their efforts into developing
the politics that will strengthen the social forces that can create growth. I
find particularly compelling his idea that we have to try to prevent politics
based on patronage and find common ground to form interest groups. Politics
based on race, origin and religion are, in my mind, destined to breed conflict
as there can never be compromise - all are absolutes.
Where
I found the ideas less coherent was over his identification of four factors
common in development states:
- External threat
- Coalition of internal elites
- Concentration of power / continuity of power
- Developmentally driven institutions
Firstly,
his definitions for each of these is so overly broad that you can make a claim
for just about any country to be included. There is also no assessment of
countries that fall into these categories but that weren't classed as
development states, although his generic last category is a bit of
self-fulfilling prophecy I suppose!
What
I found extremely interesting were some of his conclusions from this - namely
that the bureaucracies in these states were well trained and highly
competitive, while the economic institutions were insulated from outside
pressures. Reading the article by Evans and Rauch on which this assertion is
based, I'm not convinced as the data seems to be heavily weighted on the East
Asian countries included in the sample: Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea.
I have read on a number of occasions now about being careful to not allow these
countries to dominate the thinking on development - here I fear is a case of
them dominating the data to a large extent.
I
actually don't think this invalidates Leftwich's theory though - it shouldn't
hang on whether the civil service is particularly well educated / trained. The
central theory is that countries develop more quickly due to stronger civil
society - not a more efficient bureaucracy.
Why Nations Fail
The
final reading of the module was one that I thoroughly enjoyed. Part of a recent
book by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail is definitely going on my
reading list!
There
are a lot of similarities in this piece with the Mick Moore article from
earlier in the module. In both instances, the authors present a single
variable, fairly simple approach to what helps drive development and what
doesn't. Whilst Moore identifies the source of a state's revenues (earned vs.
unearned), the authors here look at the type of politics in a state - inclusive
vs. exclusive. I.e. is the government listening to its citizens and adapting
policy based on their demands, or dictating to them?
I
thought the chapter we were asked to read was extremely good for a number of
reasons, but again there were a few key concepts that struck home with me:
- Property rights - one of the key principles that is identified
is that Inclusive governments promote the protection of property rights.
For me, working in technology, this is especially interesting due to the
the tangential subject of Intellectual Property. IP law is meant to
encourage innovation in the same way that property rights is meant to -
which the authors see as a key driver of economic growth. Western
governments have undoubtedly (under pressure from MNCs) restricted IP over
the last few decades and I wonder if a more inclusive approach to IP will
be one of the areas in which developing nations can catch up in the
future. If that was to be the case, would developed nations be able to
turn the ship around quick enough to avoid being overtaken?
- The attempts to put China's growth into
perspective - this particularly resonated for me due to seeing Martin Jacques talk at a recent event.
There, Jacques was arguing that the autocratic regime in China was the
best form of government for now. That doesn't fit with my thinking as,
although I recognise that the recent Chinese governments have done a good
job of managing the economy, I believe in the power of the free markets.
The argument that the authors make here, that China is simply catching up
quickly, but will be unable to sustain this performance without moves to a
more inclusive government.
- Foreign aid - I suspect most people taking the course will
have more than a passing interest in foreign aid. Either through donations
or through having actively participated in foreign aid programs. I am no
different. I thought this section, although accurate in its account of
inefficient use of aid resources, was slightly misplaced. The answer here
is not that inclusive politics will make foreign aid more efficienty -
that is a different problem, but that the resources are directed in the
wrong areas.
- Technology and the media - again, this last section resonated
particularly with me because of my IT background. The prevalence of IT and
communications technology across the world is growing and with it the
effort and cost for a government to control information. Ironically, as
with the IP laws, the West actually seems to be regressing in these areas,
with the Snowden affair highlighting how much these governments actually
can control. However, I suspect that in developing countries, the
distribution of knowledge and communications tools will ultimately prove
to be a major factor in the overthrow of many exclusive governments.
Conclusions
Following
this module I definitely have more of a feel for the impact that a State can
have on development. It feels that there are obviously a number of factors
beyond the powers of the State that influence its ability to create a
developmental state, but that there are also a number of things that the State
can do to apply the handbrake to development if not properly considered.
